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Multipartite entangled states are a fundamental resource for a wide range of quantum information processing
tasks. In particular, in quantum networks it is essential for the parties involved to be able to verify if entangle-
ment is present before they carry out a given distributed task. Here we design and experimentally demonstrate
a protocol that allows any party in a network to check if a source is distributing a genuinely multipartite entan-
gled state, even in the presence of untrusted parties. The protocol remains secure against dishonest behaviour
of the source and other parties, including the use of system imperfections to their advantage. We demonstrate
the verification protocol in a three- and four-party setting using polarization-entangled photons, highlighting its
potential for realistic photonic quantum communication and networking applications.
INTRODUCTION
Entanglement plays a key role in the study and develop-
ment of quantum information theory and is a vital component
in quantum networks [1–5]. The advantage provided by en-
tangled states can be observed, for example, when the quan-
tum correlations of the n-party Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger
(GHZ) state [6] are used to win a nonlocal game with prob-
ability 1, while any classical local theory can win the game
with probability at most 3/4 (see Ref. [7]). In a more gen-
eral setting, multipartite entangled states allow the parties in
a network to perform distributed tasks that outperform their
classical counterparts [8], to delegate quantum computation to
untrusted servers [9], or to compute through the measurement-
based quantum computation model [10]. It is therefore vi-
tal for parties in a quantum network to be able to verify that
a state is entangled, especially in the presence of untrusted
parties and by performing only local operations and classical
communication.
A protocol for verifying that an untrusted source cre-
ates and shares the n-qubit multipartite entangled GHZ state,
|GHZn〉 = 1√2
(|0〉⊗n + |1〉⊗n), with n parties has recently been
proposed [11]. In the verification protocol, the goal of the
honest parties is to determine how close the state they share
is to the ideal GHZ state and verify whether or not it con-
tains genuine multipartite entanglement (GME) – entangle-
ment that can only exist if all qubits were involved in the cre-
ation of the state [1]. On the other hand, any number of dis-
honest parties that may collaborate with the untrusted source
are trying to ‘cheat’ by convincing the honest parties that the
state they share is close to the ideal GHZ state and contains
GME when this may not be the case. Verifying GME in mul-
tipartite GHZ states in this way is relevant to a wide variety
of protocols in distributed quantum computation and quantum
communication. While distributed quantum computation is at
an early stage of development experimentally [12–14], many
schemes for using multipartite GHZ states in distributed quan-
tum communication have already been demonstrated, includ-
ing quantum secret sharing [15], open-destination teleporta-
tion [16] and multiparty quantum key distribution [17, 18].
This makes the entanglement verification protocol relevant for
distributed quantum communication with present technology.
In order for a quantum protocol to be practical, however, it
must take into account system imperfections, including loss
and noise, throughout the protocol (generation, transmission
and detection of the quantum state). In previous work [11], it
was shown that by using a suitable protocol, the closeness of a
shared resource state to a GHZ state and the presence of GME
can be verified in a distributed way between untrusted parties
under perfect experimental conditions. However, the protocol
is not tolerant to arbitrary loss and in fact it cannot be used for
a loss rate that exceeds 50%.
In this work, we design and experimentally demonstrate a
protocol that outperforms the original one in Ref. [11]. We
examine quantitatively how a dishonest party can use system
imperfections to boost their chances of cheating and show our
protocol defends against such tactics. We demonstrate both
the original and new protocols using a source of polarization-
entangled photons, which produces three- and four-party GHZ
states, and examine the performance of the protocols under
realistic experimental conditions. Our results are perfectly
adapted to photonic quantum networks and can be used to reli-
ably verify multipartite entanglement in a real-world quantum
communication setting. In order to achieve verification of a
state in an untrusted setting, the protocols exploit the capabil-
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2FIG. 1: The verification protocol and experimental setup. a, A flow diagram showing the steps of the verification protocol. b, The experimental
setup for state preparation, consisting of a femto-second laser (Spectra-Physics Tsunami) filtered to give 1.7 nm bandwidth pulses at 726 nm.
The laser beam is split by a beamsplitter (BS) into two modes with the polarisation set to diagonal by half-wave plates (HWPs). One mode
undergoes a temporal offset, ∆T , using a translation stage and the other a phase rotation using a Soleil-Babinet (SB) compensator. The modes
each enter a photonic crystal fibre (PCF) source via a polarising beamsplitter (PBS) in a Sagnac configuration, enabling pumping in both
directions. The sources generate non-degenerate entangled signal and idler photon pairs by spontaneous four-wave mixing. Temperature
tuning in one of the sources is used to match the spectra of the resulting signal photons in the other source. The entangled photon pairs exit the
sources via the PBS and due to their non-degenerate wavelengths they are separated by dichroic mirrors (DMs) and filtered with ∆λs = 40nm
at λs = 623 nm (tunable ∆λi = 2 nm at λi = 871 nm) in the signal (idler) to remove any remaining light from the pump laser. The signal
photons from each pair interfere at a PBS and all photons are collected into single-mode fibres. Pairs of automated half- and quarter-wave
plates (QWPs) on each of the four output modes from the fibres allow arbitrary rotations to be made before the modes are split by PBSs and
the light is detected by eight silicon avalanche photodiode detectors (APDs). The protocol’s software (outlined in panel (a)) is linked to an
8-channel coincidence counting box (Qumet MT-30A) and the automated wave plates in order to set each unique measurement basis for the
parties and detect single-shot four-fold coincidences.
ity of GHZ states to produce extremal correlations which are
unobtainable by any quantum state that is not locally equiva-
lent to the GHZ state. This property has been shown to bound
state fidelities in the fully device independent setting of non-
locality via self-testing [19–21]. In addition, a related recent
study [22] has proposed a method to detect multipartite en-
tanglement in the ‘steering’ setting in which some of the de-
vices are known to be untrusted (or defective), by using one-
sided device-independent entanglement witnesses. Our pro-
tocols extend beyond these methods by allowing the amount
of entanglement to be quantified in terms of an appropriate fi-
delity measure in a setting where some unknown parties are
untrusted, as well as providing a method for dealing with loss
and other inefficiencies in the system. This makes our pro-
tocols and analysis more appropriate for a realistic network
setting.
RESULTS
The verification protocol
The network scenario we consider consists of a source that
shares an n-qubit state ρ with n parties, where each party re-
ceives a qubit. One of the parties, a ‘Verifier’, would like
to verify how close this shared state is to the ideal state and
3whether or not it contains GME. The protocol to do this is as
follows: First, the Verifier generates random angles θ j ∈ [0, pi)
for all parties including themselves ( j ∈ [n]), such that ∑ j θ j
is a multiple of pi. The angles are then sent out to all the
parties in the network. When party j receives their angle
from the Verifier they measure in the basis {∣∣∣+θ j〉 , ∣∣∣−θ j〉} =
{ 1√
2
(|0〉 + eiθ j |1〉), 1√
2
(|0〉 − eiθ j |1〉)} and send the outcome
Y j = {0, 1} to the Verifier. A flow diagram of the protocol
is shown in Fig. 1a, where the order in which the angles are
sent out and outcomes returned is irrelevant and it is assumed
that the Verifier and each of the parties share a secure private
channel for the communication. This can be achieved by using
either a one-time pad or quantum key distribution [3], making
the communication secure even in the presence of a quantum
computer. The state passes the test when the following con-
dition is satisfied: if the sum of the randomly chosen angles
is an even multiple of pi, there must be an even number of 1
outcomes for Y j, and if the sum is an odd multiple of pi, there
must be an odd number of 1 outcomes for Y j. We can write
this condition as⊕
j
Y j =
1
pi
∑
j
θ j (mod 2). (1)
For an ideal n-qubit GHZ state, the test succeeds with prob-
ability 1 (see Supplementary Note 1). Moreover, it can be
shown that the fidelity F(ρ) = 〈GHZn| ρ |GHZn〉 of a shared
state ρ with respect to an ideal GHZ state can be lower
bounded by a function of the probability of the state pass-
ing the test, P(ρ). If we first suppose that all n parties are
honest, then F(ρ) ≥ 2P(ρ) − 1 (see Supplementary Note 1).
Furthermore, we can say that GME is present for a state ρ
when F(ρ) > 1/2 with respect to an ideal GHZ state [23] and
therefore GME can be verified when the pass probability is
P(ρ) > 3/4. This verification protocol, that we will call the
‘θ-protocol’, is a generalisation of the protocol in Ref. [11],
called the ‘XY-protocol’, where the angles θ j are fixed as ei-
ther 0 or pi/2, corresponding to measurements in the Pauli X
or Y basis. In the honest case and under ideal conditions, the
lower bound for the fidelity is the same in both protocols.
When the Verifier runs the test in the presence of n − k
dishonest parties, the dishonest parties can always collabo-
rate and apply a local or joint operation U to their part of
the state. This encompasses the different ways in which the
dishonest parties may try to cheat in the most general set-
ting. Hence, we look at a fidelity measure given by F′(ρ) =
maxU F
(
(Ik ⊗ Un−k)ρ(Ik ⊗ U†n−k)
)
, and lower bound it by the
pass probability as F′(ρ) ≥ 4P(ρ) − 3 for both the θ and XY
protocols (see Supplementary Note 1). This gives directly a
bound of P(ρ) > 7/8 = 0.875 to observe GME. However, by
concentrating on attacks for the case F′(ρ) = 1/2, tighter anal-
ysis can be performed (see Supplementary Note 1), where the
GME bound can be shown to be P(ρ) ≥ 1/2 + 1/pi ≈ 0.818 for
the θ-protocol and P(ρ) ≥ cos2(pi/8) ≈ 0.854 for the XY pro-
tocol. The θ-protocol is more sensitive to detecting cheating
and hence can be used to verify GME more broadly in realistic
implementations where the resources are not ideal.
The above bounds do not account for loss. To analyse
cheating strategies which take advantage of loss we must al-
low the dishonest parties (which have potentially perfect con-
trol of the source and their equipment) to choose to declare
‘loss’ at any point. In particular they may do this when they
are asked to make measurements that would reduce the prob-
ability of success, making the round invalid, which can skew
the statistics in favour of passing to the advantage of the dis-
honest parties. This may change the fidelity and GME bounds
above. We address this to find GME bounds in the case of loss
in our photonic realization.
Experimental setup
The optical setup used to perform the verification proto-
cols is shown in Fig. 1b. The source of GHZ states consists
of two micro-structured photonic crystal fibers (PCFs), each
of which produces a photon pair by spontaneous four-wave
mixing, with the signal wavelength at 623 nm and the idler at
871 nm (see Supplementary Note 2). To generate entangled
pairs of photons, each fibre loop is placed in a Sagnac con-
figuration, where it is pumped in both directions. When the
pump pulse entering the Sagnac loop is in diagonal polarisa-
tion, conditional on a single pair being generated by the pump
laser the state exiting the polarising beamsplitter (PBS) of the
loop is in the Bell state 1√
2
(|H〉s |H〉i + |V〉s |V〉i), with s and i
indicating the signal and idler photons, respectively [24, 25].
The signal and idler photons of each source are then separated
into individual spatial modes by dichroic mirrors, after which
the two signal photons are overlapped at a PBS that performs
a parity check, or ‘fusion’ operation [26, 27]. We postselect
with 50% probability the detection outcomes in which one sig-
nal photon emerges from each output mode of the PBS which
projects the state onto the four-photon GHZ state
1√
2
(
|H〉i1 |H〉s1 |H〉s2 |H〉i2 + |V〉i1 |V〉s1 |V〉s2 |V〉i2
)
. (2)
All four photons are then coupled into single-mode fibres,
which take them to measurement stages representing the par-
ties in the network. With appropriate angle choices of the
wave plates included in these stages any projective measure-
ment can be made by the parties on the polarisation state of
their photon [28]. In our experiment the successful generation
of the state is conditional on the detection of four photons in
separate modes, i.e. postselected. In principle it is possible to
move beyond postselection in our setup, where the GHZ states
are generated deterministically. This can be achieved by the
addition of a quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement
of the photon number in the modes after the fusion operation.
While technically challenging, QND measurements are pos-
sible for photons, for instance as theoretically shown [29, 30]
and experimentally demonstrated [31]. By using postselection
we are able to give a proof-of-principle demonstration of the
4FIG. 2: Tomographic reconstruction of the three- and four-photon GHZ states used in the protocols. a, Three-photon GHZ state (left column)
and ideal case (right column). b, Four-photon GHZ state (left column) and ideal case (right column). Top row corresponds to the real parts
and bottom row corresponds to the imaginary parts. The density matrix elements are given by ρi j = 〈i| ρexp | j〉, where ρexp is the reconstructed
experimental density matrix.
protocols and gain important information about their perfor-
mance in such a scenario, including the impact of loss.
In our experiments we use both a three- and a four-photon
GHZ state. The generation of the three-photon state requires
only a slight modification to the setup, with one of the PCFs
pumped in just one direction to generate unentangled pairs
(see Supplementary Note 2). Before carrying out the verifi-
cation protocols we first characterise our experimental GHZ
states by performing quantum state tomography [28]. The re-
sulting density matrices for the three- and four-photon GHZ
states are shown in Fig. 2 and have corresponding fidelities
FGHZ3 = 0.80 ± 0.01 and FGHZ4 = 0.70 ± 0.01 with respect
to the ideal states. These fidelities compare well with other
recent experiments using photons (see Table 1) and are lim-
ited mainly by dephasing from the fusion operation [26] and
higher-order emission (see Supplementary Note 2). The er-
rors have been calculated using maximum likelihood estima-
tion and a Monte Carlo method with Poissonian noise on the
count statistics, which is the dominant source of error in our
photonic experiment [28].
3-photon GHZ Fidelity 4-photon GHZ Fidelity
F = 0.80 ± 0.01, this work F = 0.70 ± 0.01, this work
F = 0.768 ± 0.015 [35] F = 0.840 ± 0.007 [33]
F = 0.74 ± 0.01 [36] F = 0.66 ± 0.01 [27]
F = 0.811 ± 0.002 [37] F = 0.833 ± 0.004 [34]
F = 0.93 ± 0.01 [38]
TABLE I: Comparison of GHZ fidelities. The table shows the fi-
delity of recent three-photon and four-photon GHZ states from other
experiments, and includes the fidelities from this work (top row).
Entanglement verification
To demonstrate the verification of multipartite entangle-
ment we use the polarisation degree of freedom of the photons
generated in our optical setup. The computational basis states
sent out to the parties are therefore defined as |0〉 = |H〉 and
|1〉 = |V〉 for a given photon. Furthermore, the verification
protocol relies on a randomly selected set of angles being dis-
tributed by the Verifier for each state being tested. To ensure
dishonest parties have no prior knowledge, the set of angles
is changed after every detection of a copy of the state, i.e.
we perform single-shot measurements in our experiment. To
achieve this, we use automated wave-plate rotators to change
the measurement basis defined by the randomised angles for
each state. The rotators are controlled by a computer with
access to the incoming coincidence data. This approach is
needed to provide a faithful demonstration of the protocol and
is technologically more advanced than the usual method used
in photonic quantum information experiments, where many
detections are accumulated over a fixed integration time for
a given measurement basis and properties then inferred from
the ensemble of states. We now analyse the performance of
the XY and θ verification protocols for the three- and four-
party GHZ states.
1. Verification of three-party GHZ – The XY verification
protocol was initially carried out using the three-photon GHZ
state, with all parties behaving honestly. The first two angles
θ j were randomly chosen to be either 0 or pi/2, with the third
angle representing the Verifier being decided so that
∑
j θ j is a
multiple of pi. After repeating the protocol on 6000 copies of
the state, the pass probability was found to be 0.838 ± 0.005.
Similarly, the θ-protocol was carried out, with the first two an-
gles chosen uniformly at random from the continuous range
[0, pi). After 6000 copies of the state were prepared and mea-
5FIG. 3: Pass probabilities as a function of loss for one dishonest party in a three- and four-party setting. Panels a and b correspond to the
three-party setting, and panels c and d correspond to the four-party setting. The upper curves in panels a and c show the ideal theoretical case
for the GME bound for the θ-protocol (purple curve) and a cheating strategy for the XY-protocol (turquoise curve) that always performs better.
Note that the XY-protocol cannot be used here for verification as the non-GME dishonest value is always above the honest value. The lower
solid curves in panels a and c correspond to the experimental results obtained for the three- and four-photon GHZ state, respectively. In both
panels, the dashed lines correspond to the honest experimental values when there is no loss (turquoise for the XY-protocol and purple for the
θ-protocol). Panels a and c clearly show that the θ-protocol can tolerate loss & 0.5 in the ideal case. Panels b and d show the optimal pass
probability that the dishonest party can obtain when running the θ-protocol with no loss, for a given dishonest angle θ, for the three-party and
four-party case, respectively. In all plots the curves are a best fit to the data. All error bars represent the standard deviation and are calculated
using a Monte Carlo method with Poissonian noise on the count statistics [28].
sured, the pass probability was found to be 0.834 ± 0.005.
Using the relation between the fidelity and the pass prob-
ability, F(ρ) ≥ 2P(ρ) − 1, the Verifier can conclude that
the fidelity with respect to an ideal GHZ state is at least
0.676 ± 0.010 for the XY-protocol and at least 0.668 ± 0.010
for the θ-protocol. These values are consistent with the value
obtained using state tomography. Despite the non-ideal ex-
perimental resource, the lower bound on the fidelity is clearly
above 1/2 and therefore sufficient for the Verifier to verify
GME in this all honest case.
More importantly, the θ-protocol enables the Verifier to ver-
ify GME even when they do not trust all of the parties. Indeed,
the experimental value of the pass probability, 0.834, exceeds
by more than three standard deviations the GME bound of
0.818 for the dishonest case. We remark that for verifying
GME in these conditions we crucially used the fact that our
three-qubit GHZ state has very high fidelity and that the θ-
protocol has improved tolerance to noise. In fact, the Verifier
is not able to verify GME using the XY-protocol, since the ex-
perimental value of 0.838 does not exceed the GME bound of
0.854.
2. Verification of three-party GHZ with loss (theory) – We
now investigate the impact of loss on the performance of the
verification protocols. In this setting, the Verifier is willing to
accept up to a certain loss rate from each party. When a party
declares loss, the specific run of the protocol is aborted and the
Verifier moves on to testing the next copy of the resource state.
A dishonest party, who may not have the maximum allowed
loss rate in their system, or may even have no loss at all, can
increase the overall pass probability of the state by declaring
loss whenever the probability to pass a specific measurement
request from the Verifier is low.
For example, a non-GME state can have pass probability
1 for the XY-protocol when the allowed loss rate is 50%. In
this case, the source can share a state of the form 1√
2
(|HH〉 +
|VV〉) ⊗ |+〉, where the third qubit is sent to a dishonest party.
Then, when the latter is asked to measure in the Pauli X basis,
he always answers correctly, while when asked to measure in
the Pauli Y basis he declares loss. Of course, such a strategy
would alert the Verifier that the party is cheating, since he is
always declaring loss when asked to measure in the Y basis,
while when asked to measure in the X basis, he always mea-
sures the |+〉 eigenstate. However, if the source and the dis-
honest party are collaborating, and the source is able to create
6and share any Bell pair with the two honest parties, then the
test can be passed each time without the cheating detected.
The dishonest strategy would go as follows: the source sends
randomly one of the four states { 1√
2
(|HH〉+ |VV〉), 1√
2
(|HH〉−
|VV〉), 1√
2
(|HH〉+ i |VV〉), 1√
2
(|HH〉− i |VV〉)} and tells the dis-
honest party which one was sent, so that the latter can coordi-
nate his actions. For the first state he replies 0 only for the X
basis, for the second state he replies 1 only for the X basis, for
the third he replies 1 only for the Y basis and for the fourth he
replies 0 only for the Y basis.
More generally, we can analytically find the GME bound
as a function of the loss rate for both protocols and de-
scribe optimal cheating strategies to achieve these bounds
with non-GME states. The optimal cheating strategy for the
XY-protocol consists of the source rotating the non-GME state
that is sent to the honest parties in a specific way depending on
the amount of loss allowed, and informing the dishonest party
about the rotation. For zero loss, the optimal state is the pi/4-
rotated Bell pair 1√
2
(|HH〉+ ei pi4 |VV〉), while for 50% loss, the
optimal state is the Bell pair 1√
2
(|HH〉+ |VV〉). For any loss, λ,
in between, the dishonest strategy is a probabilistic mixture of
these two strategies; it consists of sending the Bell pair with
probability 2λ (and discarding the rounds in which the dis-
honest party is asked to measure Y), and the pi/4-rotated Bell
pair with probability 1−2λ. In both, the strategy mentioned in
the previous paragraph for avoiding detection of the dishonest
party’s cheating is required. On the other hand, the optimal
strategy for the θ-protocol is having the source send a rotated
Bell pair with the dishonest party declaring loss for the angles
that have the lowest pass probability (see Supplementary Note
1).
The upper bounds of the pass probability for the optimal
cheating strategies using a non-GME state are shown as the
solid turquoise and purple upper curves in Fig. 3, for the XY
and θ-protocol respectively. Specifically for the case of no
loss, we recover the GME bounds of 0.854 and 0.818 for the
XY- and θ-protocol, respectively. The GME bound for the
XY-protocol reaches 1 for 50% loss, while the GME bound
for the θ protocol reaches 1 only at 100% loss.
3. Verification of three-party GHZ with loss (experiment) –
In Fig. 3a one can see the experimental value of 0.834±0.005
when there is no loss for the θ-protocol enables the Verifier
to verify GME in the presence of up to ∼ 5% loss – once the
loss increases past 5%, the Verifier can no longer guarantee
the shared experimental state has GME. Again, this loss toler-
ance is only possible due to the high fidelity of our three-party
GHZ state and the fact that our θ-protocol has a better be-
haviour with respect to loss. The tolerance to loss can be fur-
ther improved using experimental states with higher fidelities.
However, it is interesting to note that 5% loss corresponds to
∼1 km of optical fibre, which already makes the protocol rel-
evant to a quantum network within a small area, such as a city
or government facility, where a number of quantum commu-
nication protocols could be carried out over the network, such
as, for instance quantum secret sharing [15], telecloning [32]
and open destination teleportation [16].
4. Implementation of dishonest strategies for three-party
GHZ – In order to maximise the pass probabilities of the pro-
tocols using a non-GME state, the source needs to appropri-
ately rotate the state that is sent to the honest parties depend-
ing on the amount of loss allowed. We implemented this strat-
egy for a single dishonest party by using a complementary
method, where the source creates a three-qubit GHZ state and
gets the dishonest party to perform a projective measurement
that creates the necessary rotated non-GME state between the
honest parties. This strategy was performed experimentally
for both protocols on 3000 copies of the three-qubit GHZ
state. Since in our experiment the GHZ states are created by
postselection, the loss corresponds to the allowed percentage
of tests in which the dishonest party can claim they lost their
qubit during transmission of the corresponding photon from
the source.
The pass probabilities are shown as a function of loss by
the solid turquoise and purple lower curves in Fig. 3a. They
show the same trend as the previous curves but are shifted
lower due to the non-ideal experimental state. For the no loss
case, we obtain a pass probability of 0.736 ± 0.008 for the
XY-protocol. For the θ-protocol, the pass probability depends
on the dishonest party’s measurement request θ: for no loss,
the experimental results are shown in Fig. 3b, from which we
obtain an average pass probability of 0.699 ± 0.009. When
loss is included the dishonest party’s cheating strategy leads
to a higher pass probability, since the dishonest party claims
loss when the angle given to him by the Verifier is close to
pi/2, corresponding to the minimum pass probability shown in
Fig. 3b. Similar to the discussion in the example of the XY-
protocol, the source collaborates with the dishonest party and
applies a rotation to the shared state, so that the declared lost
angles appear uniform and not always around pi/2.
5. Verification of four-party GHZ – To check the perfor-
mance of the protocols for a higher number of parties, the
verification tests were carried out using the four-photon GHZ
state generated in our experiment, now with three angles cho-
sen randomly, and the fourth depending on the condition that∑
j θ j is a multiple of pi. Again, we start with the all honest
case where any of the parties may be the Verifier. For the XY-
protocol, with all θ j equal to 0 or pi/2, the pass probability for
6000 copies of the state was found to be 0.776±0.005. For the
θ-protocol, using 6000 copies, the pass probability was found
to be 0.767 ± 0.005.
As in the three-party case, the Verifier can conclude that the
fidelity with respect to an ideal GHZ state is at least 0.552 ±
0.010 for the XY-protocol and at least 0.534 ± 0.010 for the
θ-protocol, therefore just sufficient for the Verifier to verify
that GME is present in the state. Again, the high fidelity of
our experimental state is crucial for this result. Nevertheless,
none of the two protocols can confirm GME in the presence
of dishonest parties since the pass probabilities are below the
GME bounds of 0.854 and 0.818, respectively.
6. Implementation of dishonest strategies for four-party
GHZ – The dishonest strategies that are used to implement
7FIG. 4: Impact of noise and loss on the pass probability of the θ-
verification protocol in a four-party setting. The lower curve corre-
sponds to a biseparable state (four-qubit GHZ state with a projec-
tive measurement on the dishonest qubit) and the upper curve corre-
sponds to a biseparable state (three-qubit GHZ state and an unentan-
gled qubit for the dishonest player) that has less noise. The dashed
line corresponds to the honest case. All error bars represent the stan-
dard deviation and are calculated using a Monte Carlo method with
Poissonian noise on the count statistics [28].
the two verification protocols for different amounts of loss are
the same as in the three-party case. However, we proceed in
two different ways for a single dishonest party. First, we have
the source create our non-ideal four-qubit GHZ state and then
allow the dishonest party to perform the dishonest projective
measurement in order to create a non-GME state. When there
is no loss we obtain a pass probability of 0.679 ± 0.008 for
the XY-protocol and 0.669 ± 0.008 for the θ-protocol (aver-
aged over the dishonest angle θ, as shown in the histogram of
Fig. 3d). When loss is included, the pass probabilities of both
the XY- and θ-protocols increase, as the dishonest party uses
the loss to their advantage (see Fig. 3c). A second way to im-
plement the dishonest strategy is to have the source create the
non-ideal three-qubit GHZ state for the honest parties and the
dishonest party hold an unentangled photon. This results in a
four-party non-GME state with reduced noise – as the dephas-
ing from the entangled pair of the second PCF is no longer
present [26]. We perform the θ-protocol with this better qual-
ity resource state and see that the pass probability increases
from 0.669 ± 0.005 to 0.698 ± 0.008 for the no loss case and
remains higher when loss is included (see Fig. 4). Note that
despite the second strategy having higher pass probabilities,
these are still below the GME bound shown in Fig. 3c (upper
purple curve).
The comparison of the two strategies shows that the projec-
tion method is not necessarily optimal for the dishonest party
due to phase noise in the experimental state. Note also that
as the pass probability of the experimental state in the honest
case (dotted purple line in Fig. 3c) is below the GME bound,
the Verifier is not able to verify GME for this four-party set-
ting for any amount of loss. Verification of GME is achieved
in our experiment only in the three-party setting. However,
four-party verification could be achieved using experimental
states with higher fidelities, and even with our non-ideal three-
party GHZ state we have been able to provide the first proof-
of-principle demonstration of our GME verification protocol.
DISCUSSION
The results we have presented are situated in a realistic con-
text of distributed communication over photonic quantum net-
works: we have shown that it is possible for a party in such
a network to verify the presence of genuine multipartite en-
tanglement in a shared resource, even when some of the par-
ties are not trusted, including the source of the resource it-
self. This distrustful setting sets particularly stringent condi-
tions on what can be shown in practice. With our state-of-the-
art optical setup that produces high-fidelity three- and four-
photon GHZ states, we were able to show, for the three-party
case, that this verification process is possible using a carefully
constructed protocol, for up to 5% loss, under the most strict
security conditions. Clearly, the loss tolerance of the system
can be further improved by using states with even higher fi-
delities. This would also enable the implementation of the
verification protocols for a larger number of qubits.
It is important to remark that our verification protocols go
beyond merely detecting entanglement; they also link the out-
come of the verification tests to the state that is actually used
by the honest parties of the network with respect to their ideal
target state. This is non trivial and of great importance in a re-
alistic setting where such resources are subsequently used by
the parties in distributed computation and communication ap-
plications executed over the network. Such applications may
also require multipartite entangled states other than the GHZ
states studied in this work. We expect that our verification
protocols should indeed be applicable to other types of useful
states such as, for instance, stabiliser states.
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9SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Supplementary Figures
FIG. S 1: Loss tolerance of the original and new verification protocols. The θ-protocol test performs better than the XY-protocol test and is
still viable after 50% loss.
FIG. S 2: Tuning the photonic crystal fibre sources. Spectra of the microstructured photonic crystal fiber sources. a, Central wavelengths for
source 1 (orange line) and source 2 (blue line) with varying pump wavelength. The temperature tuning of source 2 (blue points) is also shown.
b, Spectra of signal photons (top) and idler photons (bottom) from source 1 (orange) and source 2 (blue) tuned at 23.7◦C with a 726 nm pump.
Supplementary Note 1
In this section we provide further details of the θ-protocol presented in the main text (see Fig. 1). Note that the proofs for
the XY-protocol follow easily as a special case with only two measurement settings.
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Correctness of the θ-protocol
Here we prove that the n-qubit GHZ state passes the verification test with probability 1. The measurements that the parties
perform in the X-Y plane are equivalent to rotation operators around the Z axis of the Bloch sphere:
Rz(θ j) =
[
1 0
0 e−iθ j
]
(1)
followed by a measurement in the Pauli X basis. After the application of the rotation operators Rz(θ j) on an n-qubit GHZ state,
we end up with the state 1√
2
( |0〉⊗n + e−iΘ |1〉⊗n ), where Θ = ∑nj=1 θ j. When Θ = 0 (mod 2pi) the shared state written in the Pauli
X basis is given by a linear summation of terms with an even number of |−〉 states for the parties. On the other hand when Θ = pi
(mod 2pi) the shared state is given by a linear summation of terms with an odd number of |−〉 states for the parties. Thus, when
the parties measure their qubits in the Pauli X basis the parity of their measurements will be zero if Θ = 0 (mod 2pi) and one if
Θ = pi (mod 2pi). In other words, the test will always be passed with unit probability.
Security in the Honest Model
Now we prove a lower bound for the fidelity of the shared state, when all parties are honest, that depends on the pass
probability of the test P(ρ). We will specifically prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Honest Case). Let ρ be the state shared between n parties.
If F(ρ,
∣∣∣Gn0〉) := 〈Gn0∣∣∣ ρ ∣∣∣Gn0〉, where ∣∣∣Gn0〉 is an n-qubit GHZ state, then F(ρ) ≥ 2P(ρ) − 1.
Let us define a test in order to verify a ‘rotated’ GHZ state, namely
∣∣∣Gn
Θ
〉
= 1/
√
2(|0〉⊗n + e−iΘ |1〉⊗n), where Θ ∈ [0, 2pi).
Here, the sum of the angles of the parties has to comply with the condition:
∑n
j=1 θ j − Θ ≡ 0 (mod pi). The test that we are
interested in is the following:
n⊕
j=1
Y j =
∑n
j=1 θ j − Θ
pi
(mod 2) (2)
Let {Pn
Θ
, I − Pn
Θ
} be the POVM that corresponds to the above test. We will prove by induction that:
PnΘ = |GnΘ〉〈GnΘ| +
1
2
IΘn (3)
where IΘn is the projection on the space orthonormal to
∣∣∣Gn
Θ
〉
and
∣∣∣Gn
Θ+pi
〉
.
For n = 1 we have that P1
Θ
= |G1θ1〉〈G1θ1 | so the statement holds. We assume it is true for n and we show the statement for
n + 1.
Let {Pn+1
Θ
(θ1), I − Pn+1Θ (θ1)} be the POVM that corresponds to the test for a given angle θ1. There are two cases:
1. Party 1 outputs Y1 = 0. Then, the following equality should hold:
n+1⊕
j=2
Y j =
∑n+1
j=2 θ j − (Θ − θ1)
pi
(mod 2) (4)
2. Party 1 outputs Y1 = 1. Then, the following equality should hold:
n+1⊕
j=2
Y j =
∑n+1
j=2 θ j − (Θ − θ1 + pi)
pi
(mod 2) (5)
Let Θ′ ≡ Θ − θ1 (mod 2pi). It is evident that the first outcome of the test is equivalent to PnΘ′ and the second to I − PnΘ′ . For
any given θ1, we have:
Pn+1Θ (θ1) = |G1θ1〉〈G1θ1 | ⊗ PnΘ′ +
∣∣∣G1θ1+pi〉 〈G1θ1+pi∣∣∣ ⊗ (I − PnΘ′ ) (6)
= |G1θ1〉〈G1θ1 | ⊗ |GnΘ′〉〈GnΘ′ | +
∣∣∣G1θ1+pi〉 〈G1θ1+pi∣∣∣ ⊗ ∣∣∣GnΘ′+pi〉 〈GnΘ′+pi∣∣∣
+
1
2
(
|G1θ1〉〈G1θ1 | +
∣∣∣G1θ1+pi〉 〈G1θ1+pi∣∣∣ ) ⊗ IΘ′n
= |Gn+1Θ 〉〈Gn+1Θ | + |Φθ1〉〈Φθ1 | +
1
2
I1 ⊗ IΘ′n
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where we define:
|Φa〉 = 1√
2
( ∣∣∣G1a〉 ∣∣∣GnΘ−a〉 − ∣∣∣G1a+pi〉 ∣∣∣GnΘ−a+pi〉 ) (7)
It is straightforward to verify that:
IΘn+1 = |Φθ1〉〈Φθ1 | + |Φθ1+ pi2 〉〈Φθ1+ pi2 | + I1 ⊗ IΘ
′
n (8)
where as before IΘn+1 is the projection on the space orthonormal to
∣∣∣Gn+1
Θ
〉
and
∣∣∣Gn+1
Θ+pi
〉
. Since angle θ1 is chosen uniformly at
random in [0, pi), we have that:
Pn+1Θ =
1
pi
∫ pi
0
Pn+1Θ (θ1)dθ1 (9)
=
1
pi
∫ pi/2
0
[
Pn+1Θ (θ1) + P
n+1
Θ (θ1 +
pi
2
)
]
dθ1
= |Gn+1Θ 〉〈Gn+1Θ | +
1
2
IΘn+1
For Θ = 0 (mod 2pi), we can easily infer the basic argument of the proof, that the test is equivalent to performing the POVM
{Pn0, I − Pn0}. We can therefore express any state ρ with fidelity F(ρ) to the GHZ state as ρ = F(ρ)|Gn0〉〈Gn0| + (1 − F(ρ))χ, where
χ is a 2n × 2n density matrix with zero in the place of |Gn0〉〈Gn0|. We then have P(ρ) = Tr(Pn0ρ) ≤ 12 + F(ρ)2 .
Security in the Dishonest Model
Figures of merit for the dishonest case. Without loss of generality, the source generates a state
∑
r pr |r〉〈r| ⊗ |Ψr〉〈Ψr |HDE
where r corresponds to some classical information controlled by the dishonest players, and HDE are respectively the Hilbert
space of the honest parties, the dishonest parties and the external environment, which no parties can control.
Here we prove a lower bound for the fidelity of the shared state, when the n − k parties are dishonest and there are no loss
in the system. Since we consider that the dishonest parties can collaborate between themselves and with the source, any security
statement should consider that they can apply any operation Ur (possibly depending on r) to their part of the state that works to
their advantage. More specifically, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2 (Dishonest Case). Let ρ =
∑R
r=1 pr |r〉〈r| ⊗ ρr be the state shared between n parties in the space HD. If F′(ρ) :=∑
r pr max Urn−k F
(
(Ik ⊗Urn−k)ρr(Ik ⊗ (Urn−k)†),
∣∣∣Gn0〉 ), where Urn−k are operators on the space of the dishonest parties, then F′(ρ) ≥
4P(ρ) − 3.
Proof.
Case 1 : Pure state. We first consider the case without classical information r and without environment, i.e. where ρ is a
pure state |Ψ〉〈Ψ|HD. We write
|Ψ〉 =
∣∣∣Gkθ〉 |Ψθ〉 + ∣∣∣Gkpi+θ〉 |Ψpi+θ〉 + |X〉 (10)
where θ =
∑
j∈H θ j (mod pi) is the honest angle, H is the set of the honest parties and
∣∣∣Gkα〉 = 1/√2(|0〉⊗k + eiα |1〉⊗k) for any
angle α. Note that the component of the honest parties in |X〉 is orthogonal to both
∣∣∣Gkθ〉 and ∣∣∣Gkpi+θ〉.
The dishonest parties want to know in which of the two states
∣∣∣Gkθ〉 and ∣∣∣Gkθ+pi〉 the state the honest parties share will collapse
into after the measurement, and by consequence what will be the honest output YH =
⊕
i∈H Yi. They will perform a Helstrom
measurement on their share in order to distinguish between |Ψθ〉 and |Ψθ+pi〉. This measurement is optimal and gives the following
bound:
Pr[guess YH |θ] = 12 +
1
2
∥∥∥∥|Ψθ〉〈Ψθ| − |Ψθ+pi〉〈Ψθ+pi|∥∥∥∥ (11)
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To calculate the above norm, we make use of a known property, that the trace norm of a Hermitian matrix is equal to the
sum of the absolute values of its eigenvalues. After some simple calculations we can verify that the above probability is equal
to:
Pr[guess YH |θ] = 12 +
1
2
√( |||Ψθ〉||2 + |||Ψθ+pi〉||2 )2 − 4|〈Ψθ|Ψθ+pi〉|2
≤ 1
2
+
1
2
( ( |||Ψθ〉||2 + |||Ψθ+pi〉||2 )2 − 4|〈Ψθ|Ψθ+pi〉|2 + 1
2
)
=
3
4
+
1
4
(( |||Ψθ〉||2 + |||Ψθ+pi〉||2 )2 − 4|〈Ψθ|Ψθ+pi〉|2) (12)
We now perform a Schmidt decomposition of
∣∣∣Gkθ〉 |Ψθ〉 + ∣∣∣Gkθ+pi〉 |Ψθ+pi〉:∣∣∣Gkθ〉 |Ψθ〉 + ∣∣∣Gkθ+pi〉 |Ψθ+pi〉 = ∣∣∣A0θ〉 ∣∣∣B0θ〉 + ∣∣∣A1θ〉 ∣∣∣B1θ〉 (13)
where 〈A0θ |A1θ〉 = 〈B0θ |B1θ〉 = 0. We use the following normalization: ||
∣∣∣A0θ〉 ||2 = || ∣∣∣A1θ〉 ||2 = 1, || ∣∣∣B0θ〉 ||2 = pθ, || ∣∣∣B1θ〉 ||2 = qθ. There
exist z0, z1 ∈ C such that: ∣∣∣A0θ〉 = z0 ∣∣∣Gkθ〉 + z1 ∣∣∣Gkθ+pi〉 and ∣∣∣A1θ〉 = z∗1 ∣∣∣Gkθ〉 − z∗0 ∣∣∣Gkθ+pi〉 (14)
where |z0|2 + |z1|2 = 1, which gives us:∣∣∣A0θ〉 ∣∣∣B0θ〉 + ∣∣∣A1θ〉 ∣∣∣B1θ〉 = (z0 ∣∣∣Gkθ〉 + z1 ∣∣∣Gkθ+pi〉) |B0〉 + (z∗1 ∣∣∣Gkθ〉 − z∗0 ∣∣∣Gkθ+pi〉) |B1〉
=
∣∣∣Gkθ〉 (z0 ∣∣∣B0θ〉 + z∗1 ∣∣∣B1θ〉) + ∣∣∣Gkθ+pi〉 (z1 ∣∣∣B0θ〉 − z∗0 ∣∣∣B1θ〉) (15)
and from Eq. (13) we have:
|Ψθ〉 = z0
∣∣∣B0θ〉 + z∗1 ∣∣∣B1θ〉
|Ψθ+pi〉 = z1
∣∣∣B0θ〉 − z∗0 ∣∣∣B1θ〉 (16)
Since
∣∣∣A0θ〉 and ∣∣∣A1θ〉 are on the same subspace as ∣∣∣Gkθ〉 and ∣∣∣Gkθ+pi〉, there exist x ∈ R, y ∈ C such that:∣∣∣A0θ〉 = x ∣∣∣0k〉 + y ∣∣∣1k〉 and ∣∣∣A1θ〉 = y∗ ∣∣∣0k〉 − x ∣∣∣1k〉 (17)
where x2 + |y|2 = 1 (we can assume that x ∈ R up to a global phase on |A0〉 and |A1〉). Then:
|z0|2 = |〈A0θ |Gθk〉|2 =
1
2
|x + yeiθ|2 (18)
and since y ∈ C, we rewrite y = |y|eiα and get:
|z0|2 = 12
∣∣∣x + |y|eiθ+α∣∣∣2 = 1
2
(1 + 2x|y| cos(θ + α)) (19)
Using |z0|2 + |z1|2 = 1, we have |z1|2 = 12 (1− 2x|y| cos(θ + α)). Also, from x2, |y|2 ≥ 0 and x2 + |y|2 = 1, we have that x2|y|2 ≤ 1/4.
This gives us:
|〈Ψθ|Ψθ+pi〉|2 = (pθ − qθ)2|z0|2|z1|2 = (pθ − qθ)2 14(1 − 4x
2|y|2 cos2(θ + α))
≥ (pθ − qθ)2 14(1 − cos
2(θ + α)) = (pθ − qθ)2 14 sin
2(θ + α) (20)
We then revisit Eq. (12):
Pr[guess YH |θ] ≤ 34 +
1
4
(
(pθ + qθ)2 − (pθ − qθ)2 sin2(θ + α)) (21)
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Now, let us consider the optimal local operation that the dishonest parties can perform on their state, in order to maximize
their cheating probability. If the reduced density matrices of the honest parties of the ideal state
∣∣∣Gn0〉 and the state ρ are σH and
ρH respectively, it holds that there exists a local operation R on the dishonest state that maximizes the fidelity:
F′(ρ) = F((I ⊗ R) |Ψ〉 ,
∣∣∣Gn0〉) = F(σH , ρH) (22)
Let us decompose
∣∣∣Gn0〉 in the same orthonormal bases for the honest parties, as we did for |Ψ〉. We have ∣∣∣Gn0〉 = ∣∣∣A0θ〉 ∣∣∣C0〉 +∣∣∣A1θ〉 ∣∣∣C1〉. Then:
σH =
1
2
(|A0θ〉〈A0θ | + |A1θ〉〈A1θ |) (23)
ρH = pθ|A0θ〉〈A0θ | + qθ|A1θ〉〈A1θ | + Trn−k |X〉 〈X| (24)
and we can express fidelity F′(ρ) = Tr[
√√
ρHσH
√
ρH]2, which gives:
F′(ρ) =
1
2
(
√
pθ +
√
qθ)2 =
pθ + qθ
2
+
√
pθqθ
≥ (pθ + qθ)
2
2
+ 2pθqθ = (pθ + qθ)2 − (pθ − qθ)
2
2
(25)
because for all non-negative p and q such that p + q ≤ 1, it holds that p + q ≥ (p + q)2 for p + q ≤ 1 and also that √pq ≥
2pq. Let us note here that whatever decomposition we do to the state |Ψ〉, the sum (pθ + qθ) is a constant that always equals
‖ |Ψθ〉 ‖2 +‖ |Ψθ+pi〉 ‖2. It follows that (pθ−qθ)2 is lower bounded by the constant 2((pθ+qθ)2−F′(ρ)). Since θ is chosen uniformly
at random, we have that:
P(ρ) =
1
pi
∫ pi
0
Pr[guess YH |θ] (26)
≤ 3
4
+
1
4
(
(pθ + qθ)2 − 1
pi
∫ pi
0
(pθ − qθ)2 sin2(θ + α)dθ
)
(27)
≤ 3
4
+
1
4
(
(pθ + qθ)2 + F′(ρ) − (pθ + qθ)2
)
(28)
≤ 3
4
+
1
4
F′(ρ) (29)
Case 2 : No classical information, mixed state. We consider the case where ρ =
∑
j q j|Ψ j〉〈Ψ j|HD. Since the two functions
P(·) and F(·) are linear, we can write
P(ρ) =
∑
j
q jP(|Ψ j〉〈Ψ j| ≤ 34 +
1
4
∑
j
q jF′(|Ψ j〉〈Ψ j|) = 34 +
1
4
F′(ρ) (30)
Case 3 : General Case. We write ρ =
∑R
r=1 pr |r〉〈r| ⊗ ρr. We then write
P(ρ) =
∑
r
prP(ρr) =
3
4
+
1
4
∑
r
pr(F(ρr)) (31)
=
3
4
+
1
4
∑
r
pr max
Urn−k
F
(
(Ik ⊗ Urn−k)ρr(Ik ⊗ (Urn−k)†),
∣∣∣Gn0〉 ) (32)

Corollary 1. Let ρ be the state shared between n parties. If F′(ρ) := maxU F
(
(Ik ⊗Un−k)ρ(Ik ⊗Un−k),
∣∣∣Gn0〉 ) = 12 , where U is an
operator on the space of the dishonest parties, then
1. if the parties run the θ-protocol, P(ρ|θ-protocol) ≤ 12 + 1pi .
2. if the parties run the XY-protocol, P(ρ|XY-protocol) ≤ cos2( pi8 ).
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Proof. We will first show the upper bound of the pass probability for the θ-protocol and then examine the special case where the
honest angle θ is either equal to 0 or pi/2. Following the derivations of Eq. (12) and Eq. (21) we have
Pr[guess YH |θ] = 12 +
1
2
√( |||Ψθ〉||2 + |||Ψθ+pi〉||2 )2 − 4|〈Ψθ|Ψθ+pi〉|2
≤ 1
2
+
1
2
√
(pθ + qθ)2 − (pθ − qθ)2 sin2(θ + α) (33)
We know that S = pθ+qθ is a constant, independent of θ. From Eq. (25) and the fact that F′(ρ) = 12 , we have that 2
√
pθqθ = 1−S .
We can easily infer:
(pθ − qθ)2 = S 2 − 4pθqθ = 2S − 1 (34)
Eq. (33) then becomes:
Pr[guess YH |θ] ≤ 12 +
1
2
√
S 2 − (2S − 1) sin2(θ + α) (35)
It also holds that F′(ρ) ≤ S which implies S ≥ 12 . When S ∈ [1/2, 1], we can analytically show that P[ρ|θ-protocol] is maximal
for S = 1. This gives
P[ρ|θ-protocol] ≤ 1
pi
∫ pi
0
1
2
+
1
2
√
1 − sin2(θ + α)dθ = 1
2
+
1
pi
≈ 0.818. (36)
Now if the parties are running the XY-protocol, then instead of integrating from 0 to pi, we just need to add the cases where
θ = 0 and θ = pi/2. We have:
P[ρ|XY-protocol] = 1
2
[
Pr[guess YH |0] + Pr[guess YH |pi2 ]
]
(37)
≤ 1
2
+
1
4
[
cos2(α) − sin2(α)] (38)
Since α is a characteristic of the state, and can therefore be chosen by the source, the above probability is maximized for
α = −pi/4, and is equal to cos2(pi/8) ≈ 0.854.

Loss
If the Verifier is willing to accept an individual loss rate λ, then a cheating party can profit from declaring ‘loss’ in order to
increase the probability of passing the test. We are interested to see how the two protocols behave in the presence of loss. We
concentrate on checking for genuine multipartite entanglement. Since the dishonest parties have full control of the source, and
in particular their part (including purification), we treat the dishonest parties as a single system. That is, we say that a source
state |ψ〉H,D is genuinely multipartite entangled if it is entangled across all bipartite cuts where D is treated as a single party (that
is all D systems are on one side of the bipartition).
Looking only at GME in this way greatly simplifies the analysis. We now wish to bound the probability of passing the test
for states which are not GME, that is, there exists a partition such that |ψ〉H,D is separable. To bound this take all the honest
players which are on D’s side of this partition, and imagine the dishonest party has control of them too, i.e. we have a bigger
D including these (this cannot but help the dishonest party pass the test). We thus concentrate on product states of the form
|H〉H ⊗ |D〉D.
The θ-protocol. Let |H〉 = α |0〉⊗k + eiθ′β |1〉⊗k + γ |X〉 the state shared by the honest players with |X〉 orthogonal to both |0〉⊗k
and |1〉⊗k and α, β ∈ R+. For a fixed θ and using the characterization of our test, the honest players will output YH = 0 with
probability
Pr[YH = 0|θ] = |γ|
2
2
+ | α√
2
+
β√
2
ei(θ
′−θ)|2 = 1
2
+ αβ cos(θ′ − θ) (39)
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The dishonest parties want to guess YH . They will guess YH = 0 when cos(θ′ − θ) ≥ 0 and YH = 1 otherwise, and they will
succeed with probability 12 + αβ| cos(θ′ − θ)|. This probability is maximized for α, β = 1√2 . Without any loss, the dishonest
players succeed with probability:
1
pi
(∫ pi
0
1
2
+
1
2
| cos(θ′ − θ)|dθ
)
=
2
pi
∫ θ′+pi/2
θ′
cos2(
θ
2
)dθ (40)
In the case where there is loss, the cheating players can post-select on a λ fraction of the angles. This is the only thing they can
do since their state |D〉 is unentangled with |H〉. The worst angles are the ones close to pi/2 + θ′. In that case, when the state is
tested, the cheating players pass the test with probability:
P(λ) =
2
pi(1 − λ)
∫ θ′+pi(1−λ)/2
θ′
cos2(
θ
2
)dθ =
2
pi(1 − λ)
∫ pi(1−λ)/2
0
cos2(
θ
2
)dθ (41)
The XY-protocol. Analyzing this protocol is done in a similar way as before. We start from |H〉 = α |0〉⊗k + eiθ′β |1〉⊗k + γ |X〉
with α, β ∈ R+.
• The honest parties receive an even number of Pauli Y measurement requests: this corresponds to them performing a θ-test
with θ = 0. This means that the honest players output YH = 0 with probability 12 + αβ cos(θ
′). The optimal dishonest
strategy is to guess YH = 0 when cos(θ′) ≥ 0. Otherwise, they guess YH = 1. This overall strategy will succeed with
probability 12 + αβ| cos(θ′)|. Notice that this is maximized for α, β = 1√2 which gives Pr[pass test|even Y] = 12 +
| cos(θ′)|
2 .
• The honest parties receive an odd number of Pauli Y measurement requests: this corresponds to them performing a θ-test
with θ = pi/2. Similarly as above, we can show that Pr[pass test|odd Y] = 12 + | cos(θ
′+pi/2)|
2 =
1
2 +
| sin(θ′)|
2 .
In the case when there is no loss, the pass probability of state |H〉 is maximised for θ′ = pi/4, since for both measurement
settings of the honest parties, the pass probability is cos2(pi/8) ≈ 0.854. For 50% loss, the pass probability of state |H〉 is
maximised for θ′ = 0, since whenever the dishonest party is asked to measure in the Pauli Y basis, he declares loss, resulting in
a pass probability equal to 1. For any amount of loss between these two values, the optimal dishonest strategy is a probabilistic
mixture of the two pure strategies:
• With probability 2λ the source sets θ′ = 0, and whenever the dishonest party receives Y , he declares loss.
• With probability 1 − 2λ the source sets θ′ = pi/4.
Let Q(λ) be the probability that the dishonest parties pass the test, conditioned on not declaring loss. We have:
Q(λ) =
1
1 − λ
(
λ · Pr[pass test|θ′ = 0, X] + (1 − 2λ) · Pr[pass test|θ′ = pi/4]) (42)
=
λ + (1 − 2λ) · 0.854
1 − λ (43)
Supplementary Figure 1 shows the difference in the pass probability for the two tests when the amount of tolerated loss
increases. Here, Q(λ) is plotted for the XY-protocol test and P(λ) is plotted for the θ-protocol test.
Supplementary Note 2
State generation
The generation of photon pairs in our setup is achieved by spontaneous four-wave mixing (SFWM) in fiber sources ex-
ploiting birefringent phase-matching [1, 2]. The fibers are strongly birefringent (∆n = 4 × 10−4) and microstructured, with the
phase-matching generating signal-idler pairs cross-polarization to the pump laser. The waveguide contributions to the dispersion
in addition to the birefringence tailor the SFWM to the generation of naturally narrowband spectrally uncorrelated photons when
pumped with Ti-Sapphire laser pulses at 726nm. This is achieved at the flat region of the phase-matching curves upon which the
idler photons (λi = 871 nm) are group velocity matched to the pump pulse so that they become spectrally broad (∆λi = 2.2 nm)
whilst the signal photons (λs = 623 nm) are intrinsically narrowband (∆λs = 0.3 nm). This narrowband phase-matching results
in a Joint-Spectral Amplitude (JSA) which is highly separable for a wide range of pump bandwidths and thus single photons
of high purity can be produced. The pump bandwidth can then be tuned to minimize the effects of deviating from the flat re-
gion at 726 nm whilst reducing the self-phase modulation caused by short pulses, to arrive at an optimal pump bandwidth of
∆λp = 1.7 nm.
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The fiber sources are then positioned in Sagnac-loop configurations in which the pump pulse is set to diagonal polarization
and split at a polarizing beam-splitter (PBS), after which it is launched into the fiber in both directions simultaneously. The 90◦
rotation of the fiber axis between its two facets results in the pump light being strongly suppressed out of the port of the PBS it
entered, whilst the generated signal-idler pairs from each facet of the fiber are cross-polarized to the pump that generated them,
so exit from the other port to the pump. The pairs generated from each direction traverse the same mode in reverse so on exiting
the PBS they coherently share the same spatio-temporal mode and create the state 1√
2
(|H〉s |H〉i + eiθ |V〉s |V〉i) up to some phase
θ.
The generation of three- and four-photon GHZ states in our setup is then achieved by a parity check, or ‘fusion’, with
post-selection [3–6]. Fusion processes of this sort require photons originating from two distinct sources to be indistinguishable
in all degrees of freedom, however the fabrication of microstructured fibres can result in small inhomogeneities between fiber
samples. To overcome these inhomogeneities one fiber source is temperature tuned so that the spectra of the signal photons
match the spectra of the signal photons in the other fiber. This reduces the distinguishability. The spectra of the signal photons
from each source were measured for a range of pump bandwidths and Gaussians fitted to determine their central wavelength.
The second source was then temperature tuned using a Peltier cooler to 23.7◦C (relative to the ambient 17.6◦C) to achieve
optimal indistinguishability in the spectra (see Supplementary Figure 2). It is useful to note here that despite the inhomogeneous
distribution of heat to the fiber, which results in significant broadening of the idler photon, the narrowband phase-matching
scheme ensures that the signal photon remains narrowband. However, note there are still small differences between the signal
spectra that arise from inhomogeneities in the fibre and these reduce the maximum fidelity achievable.
The generation of the four-photon GHZ state proceeds by overlapping the signal photons from two Bell pair sources at
a PBS and post-selecting the event in which one photon is detected at each output port. On the other hand, the three-photon
GHZ state requires one of the sources to contribute just a single heralded signal photon in the state |D〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 + |V〉) and
post-selecting similarly. This is achieved by pumping the second source in only one direction and rotating the heralded signal
photon with a half-wave plate.
Arbitrary local projective measurements are achieved by polarisation rotations using pairs of half- and quarter-wave plates,
followed by polarising beam splitters (PBSs) to spatially separate the two eigenstates of polarisation, before collection into 8
silicon avalanche photodiode detectors. Pairs of automated achromatic half- and quarter-wave plates were calibrated to account
for the chromatic deviations at signal and idler wavelengths, and numerical methods were used to find wave plate angles to map
the input states to the states closest to the ideal projection vectors. Note that due to the chromatic deviations of wave plates, not
all rotations can necessarily be achieved, so to allow the Pauli bases and the X-Y equator to be reached, appropriate approximate
states were chosen by fiber polarizers for input to the measurement stage.
Higher-order terms from sources
4-qubit GHZ
The state generated by four-wave mixing in one source in an ‘entangled configuration’ can be written as [7]
|ψ〉s,i = N(|0, 0〉s,i + α(|1H , 1H〉s,i + |1V , 1V〉s,i)
+α2(|2H , 2H〉s,i + |2V , 2V〉s,i + |1H1V , 1H1V〉s,i) + O(α3)), (44)
whereN is a normalisation constant, |α|2 = n¯/(n¯ + 1) is the mean number of signal-idler pairs generated in a pulse and ∣∣∣`H/V〉k =
1√
`!
(aˆ†H/V,k)
` |0〉k for mode k. Taking two sources in the entangled configuration we have the starting state
|ψ〉s1,i1,s2,i2 = N(|0, 0〉s1,i1 + α(|1H , 1H〉s1,i1 + |1V , 1V〉s1,i1 )
+α2(|2H , 2H〉s1,i1 + |2V , 2V〉s1,i1 + |1H1V , 1H1V〉s1,i1 ) + O(α3)) ⊗
(|0, 0〉s2,i2 + α(|1H , 1H〉s2,i2 + |1V , 1V〉s2,i2 )
+α2(|2H , 2H〉s2,i2 + |2V , 2V〉s2,i2 + |1H1V , 1H1V〉s2,i2 ) + O(α3)), (45)
which gives 35 terms when expanded up to α3. Applying the PBS transformations for the fusion: aˆH,s1 → aˆH,s1 , aˆV,s1 →
aˆV,s2 , aˆH,s2 → aˆH,s2 and aˆV,s2 → aˆV,s1 , and taking terms that have at least one photon in each mode we have the state
|ψ〉 = N(α2(|1H , 1H , 1H , 1H〉 + |1V , 1V , 1V , 1V〉) + α3(|2H , 2H , 1H , 1H〉 (46)
+ |1H , 1H , 2H , 2H〉 + |2V , 1V , 1V , 2V〉 + |1V , 2V , 2V , 1V〉 + 12(|1H1V , 1H , 1V , 1H1V〉
+ |1H1V , 1H1V , 1V , 1V〉 + |1H , 1H1V , 1H1V , 1H〉 + |1V , 1V , 1H1V , 1H1V〉)))s1,i1,s2,i2 ,
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where the terms with α2 lead to the desired GHZ state and higher-order terms with α3 cause the state to be non-ideal. Here we
have not included the possibility of further postselection depending on the measurement basis. For example, in the H/V basis
the last 4 terms can be dropped, as two photons in a single mode will lead to both detectors from the polarisation analysis of that
mode giving a click. This is not the case for all bases however.
The fidelity of |ψ〉 with respect to the ideal GHZ state is F = 2α4/(2α4 + 5α6). For the pump power used in our experiment
of P = 7 mW in each fibre in each direction we have n¯ = 0.05 and therefore α = 0.22, leading to a fidelity of F = 0.89. Thus,
higher-order emissions up to α3 reduce the quality of the state, as measured using the fidelilty, by 11%. Terms with α4 are 0.22
times smaller than those with α3 and will therefore have a contribution of only 1 − 2%. At the pump power used we have a rate
of four-folds of 1-2 s−1. An interesting question is whether the higher-order emissions can be used by the dishonest parties to
gain an advantage when loss is present. This is a system dependent issue which we leave for future work. However, we note that
regardless of this, by using a smaller pump power one can reduce the impact of higher order terms on the fidelity in our setup,
although at the expense of the overall four-fold rate. For example, with P = 1 mW one can reduce the impact on the fidelity to
only 2%.
3-qubit GHZ
The state generated by four-wave mixing in one source in a ‘product configuration’ can be written as [7]
|ψ〉s,i = N(|0, 0〉s,i + α |1H , 1H〉s,i + α2 |2H , 2H〉s,i + O(α3)). (47)
Taking one source in the product configuration and the other in the entangled configuration we have the starting state
|ψ〉s1,i1,s2,i2 = N(|0, 0〉s1,i1 + α |1H , 1H〉s1,i1 + α2 |2H , 2H〉s1,i1 + O(α3)) ⊗ (48)
(|0, 0〉s2,i2 + α(|1H , 1H〉s2,i2 + |1V , 1V〉s2,i2 )
+α2(|2H , 2H〉s2,i2 + |2V , 2V〉s2,i2 + |1H1V , 1H1V〉s2,i2 ) + O(α3)).
which gives 20 terms when expanded up to α3. Applying the HWP on mode s1: aˆH,s1 → 1√2 (aˆH,s1 + aˆV,s1 ), and the PBS
transformations for the fusion: aˆH,s1 → aˆH,s1 , aˆV,s1 → aˆV,s2 , aˆH,s2 → aˆH,s2 and aˆV,s2 → aˆV,s1 , and taking terms that have at least
one photon in each mode we have the state (conditioned on a detection of one or more photons in mode i1)
|ψ〉 = N[ α
2
√
2
(|1H , 1H , 1H〉 + |1V , 1V , 1V〉) + α
3
√
2
( |1H , 2H , 2H〉 + |2V , 1V , 2V〉 (49)
+
1
2
|1H1V , 1H , 1H1V〉 + 12 |1V , 1H1V , 1H1V〉 +
1√
2
|2H , 1H , 1H〉 + 1√
2
|1V , 2V , 1V〉
+ |1H1V , 1V , 1V〉 + |1H , 1H1V , 1H〉 )]s1,s2,i2 ,
where the terms with α2 lead to the desired GHZ state and higher-order terms with α3 cause the state to be non-ideal. Here we
have again not included the possibility of further postselection depending on the measurement basis.
The fidelity of |ψ〉 with respect to the ideal GHZ state is F = α4/(α4 + 114 α6). For the pump power used in our experiment
of P = 7 mW in each fibre in each direction (with the source in the product configuration only pumped in one direction) we have
n¯ = 0.05 and therfore α = 0.22, leading to a fidelity of F = 0.88. Thus, higher-order emissions up to α3 reduce the quality of the
state, as measured using the fidelity, by 12%. Terms with α4 are 0.22 times smaller than those with α3 and will therefore have a
contribution of only 1 − 2%. Again, for a low pump power of P = 1 mW one can reduce the impact of the higher order terms on
the fidelity to 2%.
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